Abstract: Financial institutions' interconnectedness is a key component of systemic risk. However there is still no consensus on its measurement. Using a unique database of network of exposures of French financial institutions, we compare three strategies to measure interconnectedness: closeness of exposure distributions, identification of core-periphery structure and contagion models. The closeness of exposure distributions is adequate to identify outlier institutions. The "core-periphery" structure, usually applied to banking network, is still valid with insurance companies. However this approach is not immune to size effect. This result contrasts with previous analyses where size was not accounted for. Contagion-based stress-tests are the best suited to capture institutions' systemic fragility, emphasizing their importance as a supervisory tool.
Introduction
The objective of our paper is to analyze some challenges of assessing the interconnections between financial institutions in a supervisory perspective. The measurement of interconnectedness is a key issue for financial supervision since contagion risk has become an important concern. Current regulatory proposals rely on crude measurements. For instance, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors measures interconnectedness as the total financial assets and liabilities to identify systemically important insurers (see [23, p. 13] ). A similar process is proposed for systemic banks by the Basel Committee (see [4, p. 6] ). Such an aggregate measure is bound to mix very distinctive situations. The challenge is to propose indicators of interconnectedness, i.e. summary statistics of the interconnection, linked to contagion risk which is the true underlying policy concern. From an abundant literature, sophisticated methods, such as topological indicators, core-periphery structure or network stress-tests, are proposed. However, there is still no consensus on the measures which are the most appropriate to financial supervision. No single measure, taken alone, is likely to be sufficient to meet the needs of financial supervision, since interconnectedness is a manifold concept. Consequently, we focus on highlighting the similarities and discrepancies of distinct measures, so that relevant measures can be chosen as needed. The different objectives of supervision, such as daily monitoring or systemic institution identification, are to require different measures. Using bilateral exposures between French banks and insurers, we illustrate the different insights brought forth by each measure. The presence of financial conglomerates -financial groups with banking and insurance activities -provides a relevant case of intertwined financial sector.
Our work makes several contributions. First, we show that the interconnections between financial institutions are heterogeneous according to the type of institutions. We analyze a unique database on the exposure between French financial institutions to show the redundancy and the specific pieces of information brought by several interconnectedness measures. Second, we introduce two efficient measures of interconnectedness catching the similarity of exposures between financial institutions. The methodology provides answers to supervisory issues such as "Is institution X similar to institution Y with respect to interconnectedness?". Third, we show that the core-periphery structure, a well-established structure for banking sectors, is still appropriate when the perimeter is extended to cover insurers. However, this specific structure is not completely robust when risks are analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on interconnections between financial institutions. We contrast our work from previous results established in the literature where banks and insurers are not usually considered simultaneously. The database is presented in Section 3. The three next sections hinge on three different approaches to measure interconnectedness. Thus, we introduce two closeness measures of exposures distributions, called network-substitutability and network-integration in Section 4. Building on the identification of a core-periphery structure proposed by Craig and von Peter [9] , we measure interconnectedness with the network shape in Section 5. In Section 6, we derive interconnectedness measure from network stress-test in order to clearly catch the underlying contagion risk. Section 7 concludes building on the comparison of the three methodologies analyzed.
Literature review
Our work is related to three major strands of the financial economics literature. First, our research builds on empirical analysis of bilateral exposures where most methodological tools to measure interconnectedness were introduced. However, most empirical analysis consider only banking networks, whereas our scope also includes financial conglomerates and insurers. The seminal paper by Furfine [19] for the U.S. inspired others; see, e.g., [36] for the U.K., [33] for Germany, [25] for Hungary, [34] for the Netherlands, [11, 32] for Finland, [29] for Italy, [21] for Canada, [8] for Brazil, [16] for France, [2] for Europe. The type of data is analyzed using two distinct approaches to assess interconnectedness. On the one hand, the focus is set on assessing contagion risk using stress-test models. Contagion losses can be analyzed at an aggregate level to assess the resilience of the whole system, or at an individual level to identify institutions with specific roles. In Section 6, building on the work of Gourieroux et al. [22] and Alves et al. [2] , we derive two interconnectedness measures called systemic importance and systemic fragility. On the other hand, emphasis is given to the identification of network structures. Along these lines, Craig and von Peter [9] develop an algorithm to identify a coreperiphery structure. Banks are gathered in two distinct groups called core and periphery. The core banks are fully interconnected between themselves, while peripheral banks are linked only to core banks. The implicit interconnectedness measure is binary: either a bank is in the core and is very interconnected, or it is in the periphery and is virtually not connected. Following the application to the German banking sector by Craig and von Peter [9] , similar results were established for other domestic banking sectors. Section 5 inherits from the methodology proposed by Craig and von Peter [9] but applied with a larger scope of institutions. More generally, we distance ourselves from these individual papers by comparing the results of the different proposed methodologies.
Moreover, our paper is related to research on the insurance sector. Using aggregate data on balance sheet of US insurers and re-insurers to assess the potential contagious channels, Cummins and Weiss conclude that "life insurers are vulnerable to intra-sector crises; and both life and property-casualty insurers are vulnerable to reinsurance crises" [10, p. 489] . With bilateral exposures through provisions ceded between French insurers and re-insurers, Frey et al. [17] suggest a low risk of contagion. Closer to our work, Alves et al. [1] find little evidence of direct contagion between 29 large European insurance groups. Their database is more restricted than ours since the exposures of insurers to banks are censored to the top-10 exposures and the exposures of banks to insurers are not reported.
Finally, several research papers investigate the statistical links between equity returns when bilateral data are not available. The approach gives interesting insights on interconnections as perceived by market participants. Minderhoud finds "evidence of contagion for the US, Germany and the UK [and] this result is stronger for the insurance sector than for the banking sector" [28, p. 1] by exploiting extreme stock return comovements. Event studies for contagion between banks and insurers, such as [7] for the U.S. or [31] , present contrasted results. More recently, Billio et al. [6] infer a network between institutions based on Granger causality between stock returns. Diebold and Yilmaz [12] derive connectivity measure from a decomposition of the variance of top US banks stock returns. The authors highlight the different patterns of their connectivity measure during the Lehman bankruptcy. Barigozzi and Brownlees [3] infer a network from long run partial correlation between stock returns. Using US data, they show that the networks inferred using Granger causality, instantaneous correlations or long run partial correlation are very distinct.
Data
This section is dedicated to the database. We characterize the distribution of links and exposures. We provide analysis of the risk attached to theses exposures distinguishing a credit risk component from a funding risk component.
Perimeter
We select 21 large French financial institutions that are representative of the French financial sector. Among the 21 institutions, 6 of them (BNP, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, BPCE, Crédit Mutuel and La Banque Postale) are financial conglomerates; 4 of them (HSBC, Crédit Logement, CRH and Oseo) are considered as pure banks and 11 of them (AG2R-La Mondiale, Aviva, Axa, Allianz, CNP, Generali, Groupama, Covea, Maif, Macif and Scor) are considered as pure insurance companies. The analysis is carried out at year-end 2011. The selected banking/conglomerate institutions account for about 90% of the total assets of the French banking sector while the selected insurers represent about 85% of the total assets of the French insurance sector. For confidentiality restriction, financial institutions are not identified hereafter.
All institutions are considered at a fully consolidated level covering all activities and geographical areas. Pure banks are institutions with no significant insurance activity whereas pure insurers are institutions with no significant banking activity. Conglomerates are institutions with significant insurance activity and significant banking activity. Conglomerates represent about half of the sector in terms of total equity while pure banks and pure insurers account for a quarter each.
The exposure matrices are built on regulatory reports on "Large Exposures" for banks (pure banks and banking subsidiaries of conglomerates) and "TCEP" reports for insurers. On the one hand, the quarterly Large Exposures reports gather all exposures at a consolidated level larger than 300 million Euros (or 10% of capital). Since we consider only major players in the financial sector, we are confident that the censoring has little impact. On the other hand, annual TCEP is exhaustive (security-by-security basis) but only exposures of French subsidiaries are reported. This censoring is more pregnant for international groups (such as Axa, Allianz, Aviva or Generali) than for domestic-centered groups. Therefore, the data we analyze underestimates the exposures between financial institutions.
In terms of instruments, we gather on-balance sheet exposures composed of shares securities, equity investments, loans, debt securities, etc. The exposures are on-balance sheet items gathered in two classes, according to the Value-of-the-Firm by Merton [27] . In Merton's model, two classes of stakeholders are distinguished: shareholders who are granted the net value of asset over nominal debt, and creditors who own debt. This partition corresponds to a risk decomposition: shareholders hold more risky assets than creditors. To mirror this decomposition, the first class is composed of all instruments corresponding to equity (shares, capital investments, etc.) while the second class is composed of all instruments corresponding to debt (debt securities, subordinated debt, borrowing, etc.). For simplicity, the first class is called "equity instruments" and the second class is called "debt instruments". When the reporting institution is an insurer, the latter class is almost only composed of debt securities, which represent a small fraction of the total debt that is mostly composed of mathematical provisions (i.e. commitments to policyholders). Thus we build two exposure matrices, one for equity instruments and one for debt instruments, between the 21 nodes representing the financial institutions. Summing these two matrices element by element, we get an all-instrument (or total) exposure matrix.
Off-balance sheet instruments are excluded since they are not available in the TCEP reports for insurance. One natural concern is the impact of this blind spot on our result. First, all methodological elements presented can be applied to off-balance sheet instrument network, if available. Second, there are only few derivatives or off-balance sheet instruments for insurers. The principle of insurance accounting is that any commitment is written on the liability side. Few percent seem a reasonable figure based on [1, Chart 7] . Off-balance sheet exposures and derivatives exposures between banks represent about one third of the total exposures (see [2, Figure 1 represents the network of all-instrument exposure. Nodes represent financial institutions. For confidentiality restriction, all nodes have the same size. The position of nodes is hand-made. The six conglomerates are represented by red nodes, the four pure banks by yellow nodes, and the eleven pure insurers by blue nodes. Arrows represent exposures. The arrow from institution A to institution B is an asset for A and a liability for B. To help reading, arrows are not straight but clockwise.
Network plotting
One may have expected a three-part structure: the conglomerate in the middle and banks and insurers on both side, since conglomerates are often though as pathways between the insurance sector and the banking sector. On the contrary, financial conglomerates do not play the pivotal role, albeit they present the largest exposures.
Summary statistics of exposures
The total value of all exposures reported by the 21 selected financial institutions is e 227 bn. Figure 2 presents the shares of the exposures between the different groups of institutions in total exposures. Conglomerates accounts for most exposures: 47.7% of the e 227 bn are exposures between conglomerates, 9.8% are conglomerates' exposures to pure banks and 8.2% are conglomerates' exposures to pure insurer. Pure insurers' exposures account for 20.8% of the total exposures. Complementary to the volume breakdown analysis, Table 1 presents the shares of non-zero bilateral exposures between the same groups of counterparts. The sub-network of financial conglomerates is almost complete with a density of 97%, i.e. 97% of the potential exposures between the six conglomerates are strictly positive. Pure banks report almost no exposures to pure insurers. Pure insurers appear to play a funding role since they are exposed to almost all conglomerates (91% of potential exposures are strictly positive) and to pure banks (80%). In contrast, the proportion of positive exposures of banks and conglomerates to insurers is much lower. The overall density reaches 62% indicating that the whole French financial sector is relatively dense. One consequence of the high density is that the distribution of individual exposures presents a large mass of very small exposures (see Figure 3) . With round numbers, half of the exposures are lower than e 0.250 mn, and only a quarter of them are higher than e 0.8 mn.
Last, the debt instruments account for 91.8% of the exposures. Regulation certainly explains this finding. Cross-ownership is not legally forbidden in France, but is deterred by regulations. Actually, any significant shareholder (holding more than 5% of equities) has to stand up publicly and has to take a clear stance for its investment strategy. Besides, insurance regulation is very punitive in the case of exposures through equities. For banks, equity instruments imply large capital requirements. For instance, in Basel framework, an exposure through quoted shares of e 100 requires a capital of e 23.2, whereas the same amount of exposure through A-rated debt securities requires only e 4 of capital.
Insurer
Banks Conglomerates X Y Institution X is exposed to institution Y. 
Reported by/to Conglomerates Pure banks Pure insurers
Conglomerates 97% 92% 51% Pure banks 70% 33% 7% Pure insurers 91% 80% 52% 
Individual risk indicators
Previous summary statistics provide no insight into the riskiness attached to interconnections. Summary statistics on individual exposures expressed in Euro seems a dead-end to assess risk since an exposure in Euro is a volume concept. In terms of risks, a loan of e 1 billion from a large bank to another large bank is not the same as a loan of e 1 billion from a large bank to a small bank. Actually, an exposure represents a credit risk for the lender and a funding risk for the borrower. All in all one has to control for the size of the counterparts, to transform a volume perspective into a risk perspective. We introduce the following notations. Let n be the number of financial institutions. E K is the (n, n)-equity instruments exposure matrix. E K i,j represents an asset for institution i and a liability for institution j. Similarly, E L is the exposure matrix for debt instruments. The total exposure matrix is E T = E K + E L . Moreover, the equity of institution i is denoted by K i . For the sake of simplicity, indicators are presented for the Total Exposures. Extensions to equity instrument exposures and to debt instrument exposures are straightforward. Since institutions are considered in a consolidated basis, the diagonals of all exposure matrices are filled with zeros. We normalize all exposures by the equity of the lender to gauge the corresponding credit risk. The equity of the lender is the buffer absorbing potential loss. We denote by CR the credit risk matrix defined by
For the funding risk, we normalize the exposure by the equity of the borrower. We denote by FR the funding risk matrix defined by
Using summary statistics on the rows and the columns of the risk matrices to derive individual interconnectedness metrics raises a few questions. One first challenge is to deal with the zero exposures. Keeping the zero exposures will lower most statistics, and may lead to artificial results. For instance, if the perimeter is extended to institutions which are not connected, most indicators -such as mean or quartiles -will tend to zero. However, considering only non-zero exposures could lead to misinterpretation. For instance, one institution can deliberately prefer to get connected to a few but reliable institutions rather than be connected to everyone, including some fragile institutions. A second challenge is to analyze the rows or the columns.
Analyzing the rows provides indicators on the risk taken by the institution. If all coefficients CR i,j are larger than all coefficients of CR i ὔ ,j (for all j), all exposures of institution i represent a larger share of its equity than the exposures of institution j. Therefore institution i takes more credit risk than institution i ὔ . Analyzing the columns leads to indicators on the risk generated by the institutions. A column with large value in matrix FR indicates that the corresponding institution is a significant source of funding for its counterparts. For the sake of confidentiality, the distribution of credit and funding risk exposures is analyzed at an aggregate level. We derive the same analysis at the individual level for robustness check. The distribution of risk exposures is similar to the distribution of volume exposures: most risk exposures are very small although large exposures are not uncommon. Risk taking appear concentrated in few links. Table 2 presents the three quartiles of the credit risk exposures and the funding risk exposures (excluding zero exposures). Half of the exposures represent less than two percents of the equity of the owner and less than one percent of the equity of the borrower. The distribution of funding risks is much more compact than the distribution of credit risks, as illustrated by the interquartile. Therefore, funding sources are more diversified than investments. Note that banking and insurance regulations state upper limits for exposures on the asset side (credit risk) but not one the liability side (funding risk). In line with international guidelines, the French banking regulation sets a limit of 25% of capital for risk-weighted exposures to a single counterpart. A limit of 15% exists between systemic banks (see [5] ). Concerning insurance regulation, an individual exposure of an insurer cannot represent more than 5% of its investments (see [15, Article 24] ). This threshold can be crudely matched with a upper limit equal to the equity. Consequently, the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 2 To conclude this section, summary statistics on the credit risk matrix and the funding risk matrix are simple interconnectedness indicators. Albeit simple, they illustrate a few interesting challenges when measuring interconnectedness. First, interconnectedness should be distinct from size. Second, even when computed at individual level, these indicators are sensitive to the whole considered system. Consequently, there is no purely individual interconnectedness measure. Third, interconnections correspond to different risks. This feature leads to the question whether interconnectedness is, or should be, a one-dimensional concept. We keep in mind that a parsimonious set of indicators is always better than a large bunch of figures to take actions.
Substitutability and integration
The developed approach aims to detect "uncommon" behavior using two distance measures expressing the similarity in exposures between two financial institutions. The first measure, called integration, captures the fact that two institutions may have interlinkages of similar sizes. The second measure, called substitutability, is more specific: its encompasses the fact that the exposures of similar sizes concern the same counterparts. As substitutability is more specific than integration, two institutions that are similar in terms of substitutability are necessarily similar in terms of integration. These two measures of interconnectedness can be derived from total (or volume) exposures (E), credit risk exposures (CR) and total funding risk exposures (FR).
Methodology
We formalize the notion of integration and substitutability building on statistical tools. Let us consider for instance institution i and institution i (with i ̸ = i ) and the volume exposures. We denote by I ∈ ℝ n− the vector of institution i 's exposures common with institution i , and by I ∈ ℝ n− the vector of institution i 's exposures common with institution i . The integration measure between two institutions catches the similarity of their exposures to the rest of the network regardless of their allocation. We define the integration distance between institution i and institution i , denoted U(i , i ), as the Mann-Whitney test statistic:
≤i,j≤(n− )
The measure U(i , i ) is the maximum between the number of exposures of institution i that are greater than the exposures of institution i and the number of exposures of institution i that are greater than the exposures of institution i . For instance, if institution i has always greater exposures than institution i , these institutions are very dissimilar and the integration distance is U(i , i ) = (n − ) . Let us emphasize that we only use U(i , i ) as a distance metric, and not as a test statistic (see [26] ). The substitutability between institutions corresponds to similar exposures to the same counterparts. We define the substitutability distance between institution i and institution i , denoted W(i , i ), as the Wilcoxon test statistic (see [37] ):
The pair-wise feature captures the restriction to "same counterparts". If the exposures of institutions i and i have exactly the same counterparts with the same size, variables Z j are zeros and W(i , i ) is zero. Indeed, the two institutions are perfectly substitutable in terms of interconnections.
Since the coefficients of U and W correspond to distance metrics, the integration and the substitutability between institution i and institution i decrease respectively with U(i , i ) and W(i , i ). For instance, a high value of W(i , i ) indicates that the two institutions are dissimilar in terms of substitutability. The distance matrices U and W are difficult to analyze since they are about 200 numbers. A convenient way to summarize distance matrices is to run a hierarchical clustering analysis (HCA). A HCA is a stepwise procedure. In each step, the two closest institutions are combined into one cluster. The cluster is considered as a new institution for the following step. So at each step, the number of institutions decreases. The output is the set of groups, or clusters, of institutions close one to another. The output is represented by a dendrogram, a tree graph where institutions are reported on the X-axis and the distance between institutions or clusters are reported on the Y-axis. In practice, we use Ward's distance (or Ward's criterion) that maximizes the discrepancies between clusters. Using alternative aggregating distances, such as average, minimum or maximum, does not significantly change our results. Let us emphasize the specificity of integration and substitutability measures compared to usual interconnectedness measures. Usual measures, such as centrality or degree distributions, provide individual scores. In contrast, integration and substitutability measures are distances between institutions assessing the likeness of institutions. One drawback is that these measures are insensitive to the overall level of risk. Their greatest advantage lies in the diagnostic they provide. They can indicate whether or not two institutions with similar individual risk levels are similar. Figure 4 and Figure 5 report the dendrograms associated to integration and substitutability, respectively. The inverted U-shaped lines represents the distance between two institutions or between clusters. The distance between institutions is on the Y-axis. A cutting level ensuring three or four boxed clusters has been arbitrary selected to help discussion. Figure 4 presents the results based on the integration. With respect to the asset side (volume and credit risk), the striking finding is that there are no distinguishing banks from insurances whereas conglomerates are specific players. In Figures 4a and 4b , conglomerates are all in the same cluster whereas pure banks are mixed with pure insurers. On the contrary, the analysis on the liability side (funding risk) shows the distinguishing feature of insurers as presented in Figure 4c . Figure 5 presents the results based on the substitutability. The substitutability analysis provides complementary insights namely in terms of risk. Actually, looking at volume provides the same results as those obtained for integration: conglomerates are one homogeneous group, while banks and insures are alike (see Figure 5a) . However, the clusters identified for credit risk, as displayed in Figure 5b Figure 5c . They show that some groups identified with integration are robust whereas others are not as homogeneous as they might seem. For instance, the same cluster of conglomerates 1 to 5 with pure bank 2 is identified in both analyses. In contrast, pure banks 3 and 4 are now very distant from other institutions.
Results
In conclusion, conglomerates form a typical group. Pure insurers and pure banks appear to invest similarly at first glance (Figures 4a and b) but they differ in the allocation of these exposures (Figures 5a and b) . Insurers are characterized by their funding profiles (Figure 4c ) even if some of them can have funding mixes similar to other financial institutions (Figure 5c ).
Since the French financial conglomerates are bank-led, one may have expected to find two clusters: one for insurers, and one for banks and conglomerates. On the contrary, we observe more than two distinct groups even when we control by size. One may argue that having insurance activity, even a small one, has a significant impact on the interconnectedness. Alternatively, the pure banks considered have business models fo- cused on specific activities (such as property loan guaranteeing), whereas the banking activity of all financial conglomerates is standard. In terms of supervisory implications, we take the view that integration and substitutability analyses can help identify outlier-institution. This approach can be part of the regular monitoring toolkit. For instance, when one institution is clustered with very different institutions, it is worth checking with the on-site supervision team whether this statistical proximity can be explained (or if it is a hint for further inquiry).
Network structure identification
In this section, we compare the genuine network with a specific structure brought in light by the financial network literature. In contrast with previous methodology based on pair-wise comparisons, network structure identification techniques rely on the complete mapping of exposures. We focus on a specific structure called core-periphery structure. This structure arises in equilibrium in theoretical models, and has been observed to characterize the banking sector in a number of jurisdictions.
Review of stylized networks
Game theorists have analyzed how the setup of pay-off between players leads to network formations. One result is that core-periphery structures correspond to equilibrium (see [20] ). A network has a core-periphery structure when two sets of players are identified as follows. The first set is the core: all members, called hubs, are completely interconnected between themselves. The second set is called the periphery: peripheral players are connected only to all core-players. There are many variations of this general structure. We consider two of them. First, we call a structure complete core-periphery when (i) core institutions are completely interconnected between themselves, (ii) peripheral institutions are not interconnected between themselves, and (iii) all peripheral institutions are connected to all core institutions. This complete structure is typical in game theory. Second, we call a structure light core-periphery when conditions (i) and (ii) are kept identical but (iii) is replaced by the following condition (iv): peripheral institutions are connected to only one core institution. This structure is the benchmark for banking networks, following the seminal paper by Craig and von Peter [9] . Considering the two variations makes our work directly comparable to others papers (see, e.g., [9, 18, 24, 30, 35] ) and increases the robustness of our results. However, to the best of our knowledge, insurance companies have never been included. Note that there is no direct link between the resilience of a network and the existence of a core-periphery structure. Actually, Elliott et al. [14] show that being in the core is similar to belong to a mutual insurance scheme. Being in the core strengthens the resistance to small or regular shocks from peripheral institutions. However, when shocks are strong enough, the diversification feature becomes a contagion framework: core institutions become "super-spreaders." In that perspective, identifying the core-periphery structure from credit risk (or funding risk) perspective is relevant: the institutions identified as in the core are where severe contagion may spread.
Methodology
Our methodology borrows significantly from the method developed in [9] . The first step is to convert the observed exposure matrix into an observe adjacency matrix A obs , where A obs i,j = if the institution i is exposed to institution j, and otherwise. The second step is to compare the adjacency matrix A obs with another adjacency matrix A theoretical which corresponds to a perfect core-periphery structure for a given set of core institutions c. The comparison is based on a total error score by counting the number of discrepancies between two adjacency matrices. The fitting procedure consists in minimizing the error score on the set of core institutions c. The fitted core-periphery structure is therefore the set of core institutions c * minimizing the error score. The set of peripheral institutions is found by difference. One drawback of using adjacency ma- Table 3 . Complete core-periphery structure identification. Note: The first pure bank (PB1) is identified as member of the core for the analysis in credit and funding risks but as member of the periphery for the analysis in volume. The best fitting of the structure for exposures in volume is obtained for a censoring threshold of e 1.25 mn and the distance between the theoretical adjacency matrix and the observed adjacency matrix is 9.5%. Source: ACPR data, authors' computations.
trices is the loss of information on exposures' size. To deal with this aspect, we adopt two strategies. First, we run the core-periphery procedure on three exposures matrices: the volume exposure matrix E T , the credit risk exposure matrix CR T and the funding risk exposure matrix FR T . Second, the observed adjacency matrix depends on a threshold θ: A obs i,j (θ) = if the exposure of institution i to institution j is larger than θ, and otherwise. The minimization program is run on the set of core institution c and on the threshold θ. The complete methodology of identification as well as the results for various thresholds are reported in Appendices A and B. These robustness checks are useful to understand the results.
Results
The results are very similar for the identification of a complete core-periphery structure (Table 3 ) and a light core-periphery structure (Table 4) . Therefore we comment only the results for the complete coreperiphery structure. As shown in Table 3 , the best fitting is obtained by considering only exposure higher than e 1.25 mn. The corresponding core is composed of 5 conglomerates. The complete core-periphery structure is very plausible since there is 9.5% of errors between the observed adjacency matrix and the theoretical one. For comparison, Craig and von Peter [9] have distance about 12% on the German interbank market. The composition of the core appears to be robust to other thresholds (see Table 6 in Appendix B). The unique case where results are flawed is when no threshold is applied. In that case, about half of the institutions are identified as core. From a credit risk perspective, the picture is different. At the optimal threshold of 0.1%, eleven institutions are part of the core without including a majority of the conglomerates. The fit is relatively good with a score of 14.6%. The direct interpretation is that the credit risk is widely spread across institutions with no focus on a specific class of institutions. However, the structure no longer appears when the censoring increases (see Table 7 in Appendix B). For instance, considering only exposures larger than 1% of the owner's equity erodes the fit (from 14.6% to 27.2%). Considering a core-periphery is a dead-end with threshold above 10%. In our opinion, this finding is an evidence that the smallest risks are not spread in the system in the same way as the largest risks. Similar results are obtained for funding risk.
Comparing these results shows that the complete core-periphery structure is a suitable stylized network shape for the French financial network under specific conditions. For raw exposures, the structure is valid and the core is composed of financial conglomerates. For risk exposures, the validity of a core-periphery structure depends highly on the level of exposures considered. For smallest risk exposures, the French financial network takes the shape of a core-periphery structure where the core is not composed only of conglomerates. When smallest risk exposures are censored, the structure is not core-periphery as the fitting quality becomes poor. One interpretation is that five conglomerates are in tight commercial relationships with large volume of exposures. However, these exposures do not represent a specific area prone to contagion either in terms of solvency (credit risk) or in terms of liquidity (funding risk). Last, only four institutions are never spotted as core. In other words, a large part of the institutions is part of the core in at least one analysis. If core-periphery analysis becomes a policy tool, the choice of the class of exposures to be considered is crucial.
Volume network Credit risk network Funding risk network
Conglomerates in the core 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Table 4 . Light core-periphery structure identification. Note: The second pure insurer (PI2) is identified as member of the core for the analysis in funding risk but as member of the periphery for the analysis in volume and in credit risk. The best fitting of the structure for exposures in volume is obtained for a censoring threshold of e 1.25 mn and the distance between the theoretical adjacency matrix and the observed adjacency matrix is 5%. Source: ACPR data, authors' computations.
Conclusion
The first finding is that the core-periphery structure, usually applied to banks, is also relevant when including insurance companies. Second, the core is mostly composed of conglomerates when considering the volume of exposures. However, the core-periphery structure is no longer a robust candidate when we control for size. Empirically, we found that the pivotal role of conglomerates is to gather and distribute financial assets (i.e. inter financial institution assets) but not to gather and distribute risk. Contrary to volumes of exposures, risk is rather diversified among institutions.
Systemic importance and systemic fragility
The main motivation for supervisory authorities to monitor interconnectedness is contagion risk. The methodologies presented in Sections 4 and 5 are not particularly sensitive to contagion risk. On the contrary, we derive interconnectedness measures specifically focused on contagion risk in this section. Building on network stress test techniques, we first introduce two measures of interconnectedness: systemic importance and systemic fragility. The contagion phenomenon relies on interconnections as well as on size. Therefore, systemic importance and systemic fragility scores are not pure interconnectedness measures.
Methodology
We use the contagion model proposed by Gourieroux et al. [22] , following the seminal paper by Eisenberg and Noe [13] . The model distinguishes the exposures through debt instruments from the exposures through equity instruments. We built 21 scenarios, one for each institution. In each scenario, we consider that one institution is in default with a minimal recovery rate. The contagion model provides us the propagation of losses for all institutions. Building on [2] , we consider two measures: the systemic importance of institution i is the impact of institution i's default on the network whereas its systemic fragility is how many times i is likely to be affected by the defaults of other institutions. Specifically, the systemic importance of institution i is defined as the number of institutions suffering an equity loss no less than 10% due to the default of institution i. The systemic fragility of institution i is defined as the number of scenarios in which institution i suffers an equity loss no less than 10%. The threshold is set at 10% for the sake of simplicity (see Appendix C for robustness check).
Note that we do not analyze the probability of contagion. We adopt a conditional perspective: we assess contagion conditionally to the default of one institution. Another way of seeing this approach is assuming a uniform default risk between institutions (such as in [14] ). The measures can easily be modified with weights to take into account additional information. . Systemic importance and systemic fragility. Note: The default of CG1 leads 9 others institutions to lose more than 10% of their equity. Only two institutions through their defaults generate loses for CG1 higher than 10% of its equity. Source: ACPR data, authors' computations, year-end 2011.
Results
Results are reported in Figure 6 . Each circle represents an institution with its systemically importance on the X-axis and its systemic fragility on the Y-axis. Three groups are identified. On the right side, there is a group of institutions with high systemic importance scores. On the top part of the figure, a group of fragile institutions is identified. Last, the third group is composed of institutions with low systemic importance and systemic fragility scores. We find no institution with high scores on both dimensions. There is a strong, albeit imperfect, link between conglomerates and systemic important institutions. Since the French financial conglomerates are the biggest players of the considered perimeter, this result is not surprising. The scores are actually a mix of size and interconnectedness. In addition, the fact that several small institutions are exposed to contagion risk is also relevant as regards supervision.
Comparisons with previous results
We have presented three different approaches to measure interconnectedness that can be used by supervisory authorities: first integration and substitutability, second the core-periphery structure and last systemic importance and systemic fragility. We consider systemic importance and systemic fragility as a benchmark used by financial supervision since these measures are strongly related to contagion risk. However, these measures are more complex to set up than the others. Therefore, there is a potential trade-off between relevance and complexity. We thus examine to what extent other methods can provide similar results. To do so, we compare the clusters resulting from the analysis of integration and substitutability, the core and peripheral sets resulting from the core-periphery structure identification, and the groups identified using systemic importance and systemic fragility, running an exact Fisher test. Results are reported in Table 5 . First, no other measure can be used to identify the systematically fragile institutions. Second, the group of systematically important institu- tions can easily be approximated by other techniques. In particular, the very good match between the group of systematically important institutions and the clusters based on substitutability and integration measures indicates that the systematically important institutions have very similar exposures.
Concluding remarks
The measure of interconnectedness has become a critical challenge as contagion is a major concern for systemic risk supervision. Moreover, financial institutions get interconnected regardless of the respective supervisory scope of financial authorities. Using bilateral exposures between banks and insurance companies, we show that the core-periphery structure, well-established for banking networks, is still relevant for broader networks, i.e. networks of banks, insurers and financial conglomerates. Nevertheless, the identification of such a structure depends heavily on the way exposures are considered. The structure may somehow vanish when we control for size. Second, two new measures of interconnectedness are introduced. Substitutability and integration measures are designed to address financial supervisors' concern on identifying "unexpected" pattern of interconnections. Empirically, these easy-to-implement measures show that a joint analysis of the asset side and of the liability side is necessary to spot the similarities and the discrepancies of banks, insurers and financial conglomerates with respect to interconnectedness. Last, different approaches to measure interconnectedness are not substitutes. The systemically important institutions can be approximatively identified by examining institutions' size. But, identifying the institutions that present fragility due to their interconnections requires explicit contagion modeling. In terms of systemic risk supervision, our results shed light on the difficult nexus between size and interconnectedness. When international committees provide a score on size and a score on interconnectedness to identify systematically important institutions, the so-called SIFIs, should the score of interconnectedness be independent from the score of size? We think that the answer to this question depends on what size and interconnectedness scores are meant to represent. It is also related to the way the contagion risk is measured, since the contagion risk has two components: size and interconnectedness. If contagion risk is only measured by the interconnectedness score, then this score should be linked to the size score. If contagion risk is assessed by a combination of the size and interconnectedness scores, then the interconnectedness score should be independent from the size score. In any case, supervisory authorities should keep in mind a set of stylized facts about measuring interconnectedness. We wish our paper to be one step in that direction.
A Structure identification
Craig and von Peter [9] propose the methodology in the light core-periphery structure identification. Our contribution is to introduce a censoring threshold to define the observed adjacency matrix. We transpose the methodology in the case of the complete core-periphery structure.
A.1 Identification of the complete core-periphery structure "Complete core-periphery structure" refers to the structure proposed in [20] . Let us denote by h the size of the core (h for hubs). If the core institutions are firstly indexed, the theoretical adjacency matrix A ccp (h) presents a block structure:
where all the off-diagonal coefficients of
are equal to one, and all the coefficients of A ccp , ∈ M n−h,n−h ( , ) are zeros. A ccp (h) is a symmetric matrix since Galeotti and Goyal [20] consider undirected links. For example, a network of 8 institutions with 3 core institutions is characterized by
To compare this structure with our observation, the first step is to define a distance measure. Let us for instance consider the (n, n)-exposure matrix E, a censoring threshold θ and a sub-set of indexes c. We denote byẼ (c) the matrix obtained by reordering the rows and the columns of E so that the first indexes correspond to c:
where c is the complement of c to , . . . , n. The observed adjacency matrix, labeled A(c, θ), is defined by
To build a distance measure, we aggregate the number of pairwise errors analyzing the |A(c, θ) i,j − A ccp (#c)| in a block perspective. Based on A(c, θ) and A ccp (#c), the aggregate error matrix is defined by
The distance is the sum of the coefficients of the error matrix over the number of links:
Determining which institutions are in the core and which ones are in the periphery is seeking the partition which minimizes the distance d ccp (A(c, θ) ) over all partitions of the institutions c and all the censoring thresholds θ.
A.2 Identification of the light core-periphery structure
"Light core-periphery network" refers to the structure proposed in [9] . Let us denote by h the size of the core (h for hubs). If the core institutions are firstly indexed, the theoretical adjacency matrix A lcp presents a block structure: 
In the case of a light core-periphery structure, the aggregate error matrix for an observed adjacency matrix A(c, θ) reads
B Robustness checks for core-periphery identification
Since the sample size is small, we use a grid to search for the best threshold. The original algorithm proposed by Craig and von Peter [9] relies on simulated annealing in order to deal with a large sample size. Tables  6-8 present robustness checks for the complete core-periphery structure identification. Tables 9-11 present robustness checks for the light core-periphery structure identification. Table 11 . Light core-periphery structure identification based on funding risk exposures -robustness check. The last row indicates the distance of fit. Source: ACPR data, authors' computations. . Systemic importance and systemic fragility -robustness check 2/2. Note: On the top-left panel, one conglomerate leads 12 others institutions to lose more than 10% of their equity. This same conglomerate suffers losses higher than 10% of its equity when three other institutions individually default. Source: ACPR data, authors' computations.
C Robustness checks for contagion analysis

